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Arbitrability in the Context of Ghana’s New Arbitration Law 
Joseph Mante  and Issaka Ndekugri 
Introduction 
The last two decades have witnessed a tremendous increase in international trade and 
investment activities across the world. These developments have seen many countries open 
their doors to globalisation, economic liberalisation and privatisation.1 International companies 
seeking to benefit from the advantages offered by these developments have sought to establish 
their presence in business friendly developing countries.  
Ghana, a lower-middle-income country of about 24 million people and a stable 
democratic State situated on the West Coast of Africa has, over the years, endeavoured to 
attract international trade and investment. Its economy, which has been largely dependent on 
agriculture and mining with the former contributing over 50% of GDP over the years, has 
witnessed a remarkable change over the past few years. In 2010, the service industry grew by 
6.1% and constituted 32.8% of GDP thereby displacing the agricultural sector (which 
constituted 32.4% of GDP) as the largest contributor to GDP. The industry sector including 
construction grew by 7% contributing about 25.7% to GDP for the year.2 Overall, the economy 
witnessed a total GDP growth of 5.9% in 2010. With the commencement of oil production, real 
GDP is forecast to grow at 13.4% in 2011 and 10% in 2012 making Ghana the fastest growing 
economy in Sub-Saharan Africa.3 The World Bank’s Global Economic Prospects report for 
June, 2011 projected that the mining, agricultural, oil and service sectors will continue to 
                                                     
1         M. Sornarajah, The international law on foreign investment.( 3rd edn, Cambridge Univ Pr. 2010) 48 
2         Government of Ghana,  Budget Statement and Economic Policy of the Government of Ghana for  2011      
( Government     Publishers/Assembly Press 2010) 20  
3          World Bank,  Global Economic Prospects -Maintaining Progress amid Turmoil'  ( The International 
Bank for   Reconstruction and Development / the World Bank, 2011) 137 
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witness healthy growth in the medium term. The Bank further projects increased inflow of 
investments into the service sector, with telecommunications and the construction industry 
remaining the major recipients, due to increased confidence in the economy.  
As a developing country with physical infrastructure challenges in the road, transport, 
housing and energy sectors of the economy, the country’s drive is to accelerate the procurement 
and delivery of infrastructure projects. The prospects of increased infrastructure development 
are boosted by the oil revenues and the general health of the economy which has engendered 
investor confidence. As international contractors and consultants engage with the State, State 
entities and domestic contracting firms (as sub-contractors) in the ever increasing market for 
major infrastructure projects in developing countries, the need for an efficient framework for 
effective resolution of  disputes from transnational commercial transactions has become even 
more acute.4 In his foreword to a ground breaking work on arbitration in Africa, Mustill 
remarked that whilst lack of information on dispute governance systems in developing 
countries promotes over-caution among traders and investors, apprehension about the 
enforceability of judgments in a foreign domain may discourage trading all together.5 
International arbitration has become the preferred method for the resolution of disputes arising 
not only from infrastructure projects but also international commercial and investment 
transactions.6  With an ambition to make Ghana a business friendly place, litigation was not an 
option as the courts are still struggling to deal with a backlog of domestic cases. The need for 
the existing Arbitration Act, 1961 (Act 38) to be updated became obvious as its provisions had 
been overtaken by subsequent developments in international arbitration. The Alternative 
                                                     
4        S. Perloff, 'Ties that Bind: The Limits of Automony and Uniformity in International Commercial    
Arbitration' (1992) 13 U. Pa. J. Int'l Bus. L. 323. 
5        E. Cotran and A. Amissah (eds), Arbitration in Africa ( Kluwer Law Intl, 1996). 
6        N. Blackaby and others, Redfern and Hunter on international arbitration (Oxford Univ Pr., 2009); R.D. 
Bishop and others, Foreign Investment Disputes: Cases, Materials, and Commentary ( Kluwer Law Intl, 
2005); R. Gaitskell, Engineer's Dispute Resolution Handbook (Thomas Telford, 2006) 120; J. Glover and 
S. Hughes, Understanding the New FIDIC Red Book - A Clause-by-Clause Commentary ( Sweet & 
Maxwell, 2006). 
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Dispute Resolution Act, 2010 (Act 798) was thus enacted to ensure, inter alia, that the domestic 
law on international commercial arbitration is brought in line with international arbitration law 
and practice.7 
Act 798 deals with arbitration and all other major dispute resolution mechanisms other 
than litigation in Ghana. The Act has five parts dealing with various dispute resolution 
mechanisms such as arbitration, mediation, conciliation and customary arbitration. Arbitration, 
defined in the act as the voluntary submission of a dispute to one or more impartial persons for 
a final and binding determination, is covered by Part One of the Act. The sections under this 
part apply to both domestic and international arbitration. The second and third parts of the Act 
are novelties under Ghanaian law as they represent the first attempt to provide a comprehensive 
statutory framework for both mediation and customary arbitration. Under the Act, mediation 
is described as a non-binding process in which the parties discuss their disputes with the 
assistance of an impartial person who assists them to reach a resolution.8  
Customary arbitration under Act 798 shares a lot of the characteristics of mainstream 
arbitration except in two respects; firstly, the arbitration agreement need not be in writing and 
secondly, the conduct of the arbitration must be in line with customary law, practices and 
procedures on arbitration. Customary law, in the Ghanaian context, refers to the rules of law 
which by custom are applicable to particular communities in Ghana.9  The jurisprudence on 
the age old practice of customary arbitration is well developed and had seen continuous 
improvement through judicial decisions. In the Ghanaian case of Budu II v. Caesar and Ors,10 
the essential elements of customary arbitration as against negotiations were outlined as follows:  
(a) a voluntary submission of the dispute by the parties to arbitrators for the purpose of  
            having the dispute decided informally, but on its merits;  
                                                     
7         See the Memorandum to the Alternative Dispute Resolution Bill 2009 (Ghana) i.  
8         Alternative Dispute Resolution Act, 2010 (Act 798), s135. 
9         See the Constitution of Ghana, 1992, Article 11(3). 
10         [1959] GLR 410. 
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(b)  a prior agreement by both parties to accept the award of the arbitrators;  
(c) the award must not be arbitrary, but must be arrived at after the hearing of both sides  
            in a judicial manner; 
(d) the practice and procedure for the time being followed in the Native Court or Tribunal  
            of the area must be followed as nearly as possible; and  
(e) publication of the award.  
These principles have now been codified under the new legislation. Act798 also deals with the 
institutional, financial and administrative support systems for the resolution processes.11  
Section 1 of the Act dealing with the scope of the legislation is the focus of this work.  
It states: 
This Act applies to matters other than those that relate to 
(a) the national or public interest; 
(b) the environment; 
(c) the enforcement and interpretation of the Constitution; or 
(d) any other matter that by law cannot be settled by an alternative dispute resolution 
method. 
As this Act is the main source of arbitration law, the section raises the question concerning, 
inter alia, matters that are arbitrable.  This article critically examines this provision in the light 
of international trends on arbitrability, how it is likely to be enforced and implications for 
arbitration in international business connected with Ghana. It is structured as follows. The very 
next section outlines the arbitrability concept as a necessary introduction. This is followed by 
an overview of modern trends on arbitrability. The third section analyses a ruling in the 
                                                     
11        Act 798, part 4. 
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Attorney- General v. Balkan Energy LLC & Ors 12(the Balkan Energy Case), a case which 
raised the issue of arbitrability under the new arbitration law. There is then some discussion on 
the scope of the categories of subject-matters exempted from the purview of the Act, the 
implications of the extent of the exemptions on international arbitration connected with Ghana, 
the likely jurisdictional challenges that may ensue in practice and the impact on foreign 
business entities. This is followed by a brief comparison of the Ghanaian position with modern 
trends on arbitrability , recommendations for amendment of section 1 to bring it in line with 
the vision of the country as an international arbitration- friendly State, and the conclusion.   
The Arbitrability Concept 
The word ‘arbitrability’ is used in a number of senses. Traditionally, arbitrability concerns the 
question of which type of disputes can or cannot be resolved by arbitration.13 This concept is 
inherent in the New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral 
Awards, 1958 (NYC) and the UNCITRAL Model law on international commercial arbitration, 
1985 (as amended in 2006) (the Model Law). Articles II (1) and V (2) (a) of the NYC and 
Articles 34(2) (b) and 36(1) (b) (i) of the Model Law refer to arbitrability in terms of disputes 
‘capable of settlement by arbitration’. This concept therefore raises the question of the validity 
of the arbitration agreement, which could strip an arbitrator of jurisdiction to determine a matter 
in spite of party agreement or derail enforcement of an award.14 Access to the national court to 
determine a dispute is considered the quintessential form of justice. An arbitration agreement 
is therefore considered a compromise to accept less than this ideal form of justice.15 It is, 
                                                     
12        Suit No. BDC/32/10 dated 6th September, 2010 (Unreported). 
13        N. Blackaby and others (n.6) para 2.111.See also L.A. Mistelis, and S.L. Brekoulakis(eds), Arbitrability: 
International and Comparative Perspectives ( Kluwer Law Intl, 2009) 3-4.   
14        The Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, 1958 (the New York 
Convention), Article V (2) (a);  the UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration, 
1985 (as amended in 2006) (the Model Law), Article 34 (2) (b) (i). 
15        A. Redfern, Law and practice of international commercial arbitration (Sweet & Maxwell, 2004). 
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therefore, for each State to decide which matters should not be compromised by leaving them 
to be decided outside the State courts. 
However, in some jurisdictions, particularly the United States of America, the concept 
of arbitrability is not just about what subject-matter is capable of resolution by arbitration but 
also has to do with matters of capacity16 and the scope of the arbitration agreement.17 Beyond 
the issue of capacity and scope, there is also the issue of the existence or otherwise of the 
arbitration agreement. In the American case of MCI Telecommunications Corp. v. Exalon 
Indus., Inc. the learned judge argued, ‘…a claim that nothing is subject to arbitration because 
there is no agreement to arbitrate must be the mother of arbitrability questions’.18 This 
statement suggests that the question whether or not there is an arbitration agreement itself 
remains an issue of arbitrability as the arbitrator’s jurisdiction to arbitrate such a matter in that 
context is dependent on the existence of an agreement. Thus, according to this view, beyond a 
statutory statement of what is and what is not arbitrable, there is also the issue of arbitrability 
on the basis of the agreement between the parties. Where the parties have not agreed or 
consented to refer an issue to the arbitrator, such a matter will remain ‘unarbitrable’ by the 
arbitrator or tribunal in question. Bockstiegel argues that where a party (a minor or a State 
entity) lacks the requisite capacity, this will invariably result in a situation where arbitration 
will simply remain impossible.19 His argument is succinctly captured in this extract, 
 
In regulating arbitrability on the one hand and capacity on the other hand, different             
means are employed to regulate the same question, namely whether arbitration is to be 
                                                     
16        K-H. Böckstiegel,  ' Public Policy as a Limit to Arbitration and its Enforcement' (11th IBA International 
Arbitration Day and United Nations New York Convention Day: The New York Convention: 50 Year, 
New York,  1 February 2008) 1-10. 
17        A.S. Rau, 'The Arbitrability Question Itself' (1999) 10  Am. Rev. Int'l Arb., 287-559;  A.S. Rau, 'Arbitral 
Jurisdiction and the Dimensions of 'Consent'. U of Texas Law, Law and Econ Research Paper No. 103,1; 
See also N. Blackaby and others (n.6) para 2.111. 
18        138 F.3d 426 at 429 (1st Cir. 1998) cited in A.S. Rau, 'The Arbitrability Question Itself' (n17) 355. 
19        K-H. Böckstiegel (n.16) 5. 
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an accepted method of dispute settlement or not. If the term ‘arbitrability’ is seen as 
answering that question, also regulating what is commonly understood as ‘capacity’ is 
in fact a regulation of arbitrability by subjective criteria, namely by criteria connected 
with the parties in arbitration. And even if one wishes to stick to the traditional restricted 
concept of ‘arbitrability’ as excluding such subjective criteria, one will have to admit 
that such objective arbitrability and capacity supplement each other, and that a realistic 
answer to the basic questions at stake, whether the arbitral agreement is valid and 
whether arbitration is admissible, can only be given if both aspects are examined.20 
 
In effect, the question of who can submit to arbitration (capacity) is as important as what is 
arbitrable (subject -matter arbitrability).21 So also is the question of what was eventually 
submitted to arbitration (the scope of the arbitration clause or the submission agreement).22  
Whilst appreciating that the consequences of all these scenarios will invariably impact the 
conduct of arbitration, it is also true that the question what can be arbitrated is different from 
who can arbitrate. This article focuses on the question which type of dispute can or cannot be 
resolved by arbitration under Ghana law. 
  
It is trite, however, that under the widely accepted Competence-Competence and 
separability principles, an arbitral tribunal has jurisdiction to determine the issue of 
arbitrability.23   That said, the question which follows immediately is whether that precludes 
                                                     
20        ibid. 
21        ibid. 
22      A.S. Rau (n.16) 309.  Rau argues, “I suppose it could be said that the scope of a valid arbitration clause is in 
just this sense "jurisdictional”, and thus a question of "arbitrability." A party may well have "consented" 
to the arbitration of disputes relating to a contractual shipment of pork bellies--but he has not necessarily 
"consented" thereby to arbitrate disputes arising out of an arguably distinct contract for the shipment of pig 
iron: Why, then, should any "arbitrator's assumption of jurisdiction over the latter be entitled to the slightest 
deference?  
23        See the Model Law, Article 16 which states that the arbitral tribunal may rule on its own jurisdiction 
particularly in respect of the existence or validity of the arbitration agreement.  
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the court of the seat of the arbitration from making such a determination either concurrently or 
prior to the exercise of such powers by the tribunal. It has been argued that failure to follow 
the Competence-Competence rule is likely to paralyse the arbitral process since the parties may 
find themselves in the national court every now and then thereby disrupting the process.24 The 
court of the seat of arbitration have power to determine the issue of arbitrability if raised as a 
jurisdictional issue before it by a party dissatisfied by an earlier ruling on the matter by a 
tribunal. Article 16(3) of the Model Law provides: 
  
… [I]f the arbitral tribunal rules as a preliminary question that it has jurisdiction, any 
party may request, within thirty days after having received notice of that ruling, the 
court specified in article 6 to decide the matter, which decision shall be subject to no 
appeal; while such a request is pending, the arbitral tribunal may continue the arbitral 
proceedings and make an award.  
 
English law takes a slightly different approach on this issue. Pursuant to the doctrine of party 
autonomy, the English Arbitration Act 1996 provides that subject to the agreement of the 
parties, an objection to the substantive jurisdiction of an arbitral tribunal may be determined in 
an award as to jurisdiction or as part of the award on the merits of the case by the arbitral 
tribunal.25 A party may also elect to apply to the High Court for the determination of any 
question as to the substantive jurisdiction of the tribunal, upon notice to the other parties, and 
subject to the fulfillment of either of two conditions; firstly, that all parties agree in writing to 
such a step being taken and secondly, that the arbitral tribunal has permitted such a step  on the 
grounds of substantial savings in cost, promptness in the making of the application and the 
                                                     
24        J. Paulsson, 'Accepting International Arbitration in Fact- and not Only in Words'  in  E. Cotran and A. 
Amissah (n 5) 36. See also the Model Law, Article 16(3). 
25        The English Arbitration Act 1996, s 31(4). 
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existence of good reasons warranting the determination of the matter by the court.26  The import 
of these provisions is that, parties to arbitration under English law can decide that the court, 
instead of the arbitral tribunal, should determine the issue of arbitrability. Appeal against the 
decision of the court on such a preliminary jurisdictional issue shall only be entertained with 
the leave of the court.27 
  
Modern Trends on Arbitrability 
What is arbitrable and what is not varies globally. Generally, issues about public policy are not 
arbitrable. Domestic legislation on arbitrability in terms of subject-matter coverage differs from 
State to State.28 Each state decides which dispute, in furtherance of its political, social and 
economic interests, may or may not be resolved by arbitration, which is a private process but 
could produce outcomes with public consequences.29 There is therefore the issue of arbitrability 
by the law of the arbitration agreement, the law of the seat of the arbitration and the law of the 
entity. Arbitrability under a given law is therefore a matter of its underlying public policy.30 
Some State laws expressly make public policy the determining factor for arbitrability.31 
  The challenge with the use of public policy as a rationale for arbitrability is that it is a 
nebulous concept determinable according to the subjective judgment of the legal fraternity of 
a State as to what matters are so sacrosanct only national courts should have jurisdiction to deal 
                                                     
26        ibid. s 32(1)& (2) 
27        ibid. s 32(5) 
28        N. Blackaby and others (n.6). Each state determines which matters may or may not be resolved by 
arbitration in accordance with its own political, social and economic policy. The authors, who have, in 
previous editions, used “public policy”, avoid the concept somewhat as a basis for determination of what 
is arbitrable. See also K-H. Böckstiegel (n16); P.M.  Baron and S. Liniger,'A Second Look at 
Arbitrability:  Approaches to arbitration in the United States, Switzerland and Germany (2003) 19 
Arbitration International 27-54 at 27.  
29        L.A. Mistelis and  S.L. Brekoulakis (n13). 
30        S.L. Brekoulakis, 'On Arbitrability: Persisting Misconceptions and New Areas of Concern'  in L.A. 
Mistelis and  S.L. Brekoulakis (n13) 19- 44  
31        For example, the Malaysian Arbitration Act, 2005, Section 4 (1) provides as follows: “Any dispute which 
the parties have agreed to submit to arbitration under an arbitration agreement may be determined by 
arbitration unless the arbitration agreement is contrary to public policy”. See also the French Civil Code 
2060 and the Singapore International Arbitration Act, 1996, Article 11. 
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with. Aside being a difficult concept to define, it also changes with time and needs of States.32 
What was viewed as sacrosanct and thus determinable only by national courts by the legal 
fraternity of a particular country two decades ago may not be the same today.33 The changing 
political, economic, social and religious views and needs of a State may shape its public policy. 
It is axiomatic that over the years, many States have embraced the notion of international trade 
and its importance and have become much more liberal with the idea of arbitrating subject-
matters which are trade or economic related.34  
In most developed countries in Europe and America however, changes have been made 
through judicial pronouncements regarding arbitrability of public policy issues.35 Instead of the 
traditional position of precluding arbitrators from deciding disputes affected by public policy 
all together because such disputes are not arbitrable, there are some judicial decisions which 
indicate that arbitrators should not be excluded from applying public policy rules.36 In effect, 
instead of being a bar to arbitration, it is rather seen as a matter the arbitrator must consider at 
the award stage. 
It is worth noting, however, that this position is not global. For many developing 
countries the traditional view that public policy issues are not arbitrable still hold sway. 
Developing countries may have special reasons to control certain types of disputes that are 
otherwise arbitrable. It has been argued that in the context of less developed countries, States 
                                                     
32        K-H.  Böckstiegel (n.16) 3 
33        ibid. 
34        N. Blackaby and others (n6) para 2.114.  
35        See  S.L Brekoulakis (n 30) 20 where decisions from the United States (Mitsubishi Motors Corp v. Soler 
Chrysler Plymouth Inc  473 U.S. 614 S Ct 3346 (1985)  (U.S. Supreme Court, 2 July 1985), France, 
England and Switzerland are referred to in support of this position.  
36        See e.g. Fiona Trust & Holding Corporation and Others v. Privalov and Others( the Fiona Trust Case) 
[2007] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 267 as confirmed by the H L  in Premium Nafta Products Limited (20th Defendant) 
and others v. Fili Shipping Company Limited (14th Claimant) and others (the Premium Nafta Case)  
[2007] UKHL 40. In the latter case, the then House of Lords regarded the public policy issue as to 
whether  an  agreement had been procured by fraud/bribery as a matter  capable of being determined  by 
arbitration.   
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may need to impose very strict limits on arbitrability, especially in respect of disputes involving 
State entities as this is the only way for these States to retain control over foreign trade and 
investment, where more economically powerful traders may have an unfair advantage.37  Apart 
from the political reasons, the private nature of arbitration and its legitimacy as a resolution 
method for public disputes and the qualifications of arbitrators (who may not be legally 
qualified to determine certain legal matters) are some of the other reasons why limits may be 
set on arbitrability. 
Matters generally accepted as not arbitrable include criminal matters and status of an 
individual or a corporate entity. Depending on the applicable law and the disputed matter, 
disputes about fraud allegations38, patents, copyright, anti-trust and competition matters may 
or may not be arbitrable.39 Under article 2060 of the French Civil Code all matters of public 
interest are not arbitrable. The French courts have however interpreted this provision very 
restrictively.40   
For some States, concerns of public interest notwithstanding, transactions involving the 
State and its agencies are expressly made arbitrable. Section 5 of the Malaysian Arbitration 
Act, 2005 provides that the Act ‘shall apply to any arbitration to which the Federal Government 
or the Government of any component state of Malaysia is a party’.  Article 1 of the Legislative 
Decree No. 93-09 of 1993 of Algeria takes a slightly different but interesting position on the 
involvement of the State or its entities in arbitration. After exempting obligations relating to 
                                                     
37        N. Blackaby and others (n6) para 2.114.  See M. Sornarajah, ‘The UNCITRAL Model Law: A Third 
World Viewpoint’ (1989) 6 J Intl Arb 7 at 16. 
  
38        See the decision in the Fiona Trust and Premium Nafta Cases (n36).  
39        P.M. Baron and S. Liniger (n28); M.  Skinner and J. Simpkins, 'Enforcement of foreign awards in 
Australia' (2011) 77 (1) Arbitration 54-58 . See also Council Regulation No 44/2001 of 22 December 
2000 on Jurisdiction and the Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial 
Matters, Consolidated version of January-04-2005 (which gives the courts of member States exclusive 
jurisdiction to determine certain disputes including those involving the validity of patents, trademarks and 
designs).  
40        N. Blackaby (n6) para 2.112 
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food, rights of succession, accommodation and clothing, public order and the status or capacity 
of persons, it provides, ‘Entities of public law may not compromise except in international 
trade relations’. In effect, whilst the Algerian law states clearly that public entities may not 
compromise on domestic disputes, it allows such entities the right to do so in international trade 
relations.   
Section 4 of the Zambian Arbitration Act, No. 19 of 2000 provides that, subject to the 
State Proceedings Act, the legislation is applicable to any arbitration agreement to which the 
Republic is a party but shall not apply to inter-State arbitration or arbitration between the 
Zambian State and an undertaking wholly controlled by another State (unless there is a contrary 
agreement). Section 41 of the Arbitration Act, 1995 of Kenya states quite simply that the 
provisions of the Act shall bind the State. The position of the laws of the States cited above are 
pragmatic in that, they admit the reality of the status of the modern State not only as a Sovereign 
but also a merchant with international commercial ties which more often than not, result in 
conflicts which require resolution by arbitration. 
The Balkan Energy case 
The facts41 were that the Government of Ghana entered into a Memorandum of Understanding 
with the 1st Defendant to revamp a power barge. Subsequently, a Power Purchase Agreement 
(PPA) was entered into between the Government and the 2nd Defendant42  on 27th July, 2007 
under which it was agreed that the 3rd Defendant was to make the barge operational within 
ninety days. As a result of differences between the Government and the Defendants, the barge 
was not made operational within the stipulated ninety days. Failing subsequent attempts to 
                                                     
41        The facts of this case are distilled from the ruling of the High Court (Commercial Division) in the case 
dated 6th September, 2010. The authors are mindful that this is an ongoing matter. Thus the discussion of 
this case is restricted to the applications which were determined by the court.  
42        A wholly foreign-owned company incorporated in Ghana in compliance with the requirements of the 
Energy Commission Act, 1997 (Act 541) 
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resolve the differences amicably, with both parties alleging breach of the PPA, the Defendants 
served notice of commencement of arbitration as per clause 22 of the PPA (the Arbitration 
agreement) on 23rd December, 2009. Subsequently, an attachment order was made against the 
assets of the State of Ghana by a Court in the Netherlands on 26th February, 2010. It was this 
step which led to the instant application before the High Court (Commercial Division) in 
Ghana. 
The State sought an interim injunction against the 2nd Defendant to restrain it from 
carrying on with the arbitration instituted against it before the Permanent Court of Arbitration 
or commencing any further arbitration proceedings in any jurisdiction outside Ghana. The 2nd 
Defendant, in response, applied for a stay of proceedings (before the Ghanaian court) pending 
the completion of the said arbitration.  In support of the Attorney-General’s application for an 
injunction, the State contested the validity of the PPA which constituted the basis of the on-
going arbitration. The Attorney-General argued, inter alia, that the Power Purchase Agreement, 
as an international transaction, required parliamentary approval for it to be legally binding 
according to Article 181(5) of the 1992 Constitution of Ghana. In the absence of such an 
approval, the whole transaction was a nullity including the arbitration agreement. It was further 
argued that the nature of the said transaction was a matter of interpretation and enforcement of 
the Constitution of Ghana and thus excluded from the arbitrable subject-matters under Act 798. 
In opposing the application for injunction and in support of the application for an order 
staying proceedings, Counsel for the 2nd Defendant argued, inter alia, that matters relating to 
the jurisdiction of the arbitral tribunal in respect of the existence, scope or validity of the 
arbitration agreement and the existence or validity of the substantive agreement to which the 
arbitration agreement relates  were within the competence of the Tribunal and ought to be raised 
14 
 
before it and not the Ghanaian court.43  Counsel argued further that, assuming the Attorney-
General’s position was to be accepted, the arbitration agreement was separable from the main 
agreement.  
The Court granted the injunction and dismissed the application for stay of proceedings 
purely on the basis of domestic civil procedure rules on injunction, largely ignoring the 
principles of international commercial arbitration44. Though the ruling impliedly suggested that 
issues of constitutional interpretation may be at stake, the learned trial judge neither made this 
express determination nor was the matter referred to the Supreme Court as per the requirements 
of the Constitution in such cases. The court’s ruling was based on the existence of a prima facie 
case and on the balance of probabilities. In deciding in favour of the Attorney-General, the 
Court argued, ‘in my opinion, there is the real danger to the Plaintiff [the State] outside its 
territorial borders and over which the court’s power do not extend’.45 
It is fair to say from the totality of the reasoning provided that the court did not expressly 
rule on the issue of arbitrability. By implication however, the court held that the issue as to 
whether the agreement is void or not is a matter to be determined by the pending suit in the 
courts. This inference is supported by the court’s failure to uphold the argument that the matters 
raised before the Ghanaian courts were matters which ought to be determined by the arbitral 
tribunal. The determination of the question whether or not the subject-matter of the arbitration 
(with the constitutional implications) was arbitrable is a matter for the arbitral tribunal per 
section 24 of Act 798, unless the parties had agreed otherwise.  
 
                                                     
43        See Act 798,s 24 and the Model Law, Article 16. 
44     The decision of the court to issue an anti-arbitration injunction is not a unique case as this practice is    widely 
accepted in English jurisprudence in exceptional circumstances. See Nomihold Securities Inc v Mobile 
Telesystems Finance SA [2012] EWHC 130 (Comm.), Excalibur Ventures LLC v Texas Keystone Inc 
[2011] EWHC1624 (Comm.); [2011] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 289 
 
45        See the ruling in the Balkan Energy Case,  12  
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Discussion 
The categories of exclusions from the ambit of Act 798, which covers not only ADR as 
understood by the international business community and local methods of alternative dispute 
resolution but also international commercial arbitration, are matters relating to ‘national or 
public interest’, ‘the environment’, ‘constitutional interpretation and enforcement’, and “any 
other matter that by law cannot be settled by an alternative dispute resolution method”. These 
terms warrant comment in the light of, first, the debate on the Bill which resulted in the Act 
during its passage through the Ghana Parliament and, second, related aspects of the general 
legal framework in Ghana.  
 
National or Public Interest 
Unfortunately, the Act provides no definition for the terms ‘public interest’ and ‘national 
interest’. In the debate in Parliament, a fleeting reference was made to these phrases.46 For 
example, on the issue of “national interest”, the Chairman of the Parliamentary Committee on 
the Bill made this contribution to the debate: 
 
We are saying that in matters of national interest, we must not give power to persons to 
settle disputes that touch and concern national interest by themselves… in matters of 
constitutional interpretation and application, persons or individuals must not have the 
power to settle any dispute arising from the constitution by arbitration. So we are 
excepting these acts from matters that can be resolved by alternative dispute 
resolution.47 
                                                     
46         The Parliamentary Debates of Ghana, Official Report, Tuesday, 16th March, 2010, Fourth Series,   
             Volume 67,No. 30, Column 2252 . 
47   See also the contribution of Honourable Inusah Fuseini, Member of Parliament in the Parliamentary 
Debates of Ghana, Official Report, Tuesday, 16th March, 2010, Fourth Series, Volume 67,No. 30, 
Column 2252 and 2254 
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Matters relating to constitutional interpretation and application/enforcement are therefore 
perceived as matters of national interest, thus calling into question the decision to include 
“constructional interpretation and enforcement” as a separate excluded category. In the absence 
of definitions for these terms one has to look elsewhere in Ghanaian law for the meanings 
attributable to them. Article 295(1) of the Constitution, 1992 defines “public interest” to 
include ‘any right or advantage which enures or is intended to enure to the benefit generally of 
the whole of the people of Ghana’.48 The use of the word ‘include’ by the Constitution 
demonstrates the open-ended nature of the definition. Under section 98 of the Public 
Procurement Act, 2003 (Act 663), “national interest” is defined as ‘a condition where the nation 
attaches high value, returns, benefit and consideration to the matter in question’.  These 
definitions are so broad that most contracts entered into by the State, government departments 
and other State entities are likely to be caught by the exemptions.  In a sense, section 1 of Act 
798 is to the effect that disputes arising from public transactions including those listed above, 
particularly contracts for the procurement of major infrastructure projects, are not arbitrable 
under Act 798!  
It is, however, commonplace that government bilateral investment treaties and 
agreements with foreign investors and other entities contain clauses on international arbitration 
sanctioned by legislation such as the Ghana Investment Promotion Council Act,1994  (Act 478) 
and the Free Zones Act,1995 (as amended) (Act 504). Such contracts often relate to 
transactions that the public attach high value and importance to or consider beneficial to the 
people of Ghana generally. For example, a public transaction relating to the generation of 
electricity must certainly be a matter of public interest or ‘relate’ to a matter of public interest 
                                                     
48  See the Electronic Transactions Act, 2008 (Act 772), s 144 for a similar definition for the term.  
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or national interest (electricity generation), particularly so when at the time of the said contract 
the country was experiencing energy crises. 
 Under section 29 of the Ghana Investment Promotion Council Act, 1994 (Act 478),49 
investors who are unable to settle their disputes amicably with the State are permitted to 
proceed, at their own election, to international arbitration under: (a) the rules of UNCITRAL; 
(b) any multilateral or bilateral treaty on investment to which Ghana is a party; or (c) any other 
‘national or international machinery for settlement of investment dispute agreed to by the 
parties’ (emphasis added). Why will the State be willing to submit such matters which may 
involve or relate to matters of national interest or public interest to international arbitration?  It 
is therefore submitted that the existence of section 29 of Act 478 and section 32 of the Free 
Zones Act, 1995 indicate that the focus of the exemptions under section 1 of Act 798 is more 
on alternative dispute resolution mechanisms other than international commercial arbitration. 
Unfortunately, the language of Act 798 does not reflect this position.  
 
The Environment 
In its literal sense, the term “environment” may refer to the area in which something exists or 
a person’s surroundings. It may also refer to the conditions under which a person or a thing 
exists.50 The suspicion here is that the exemption refers to matters which directly affect the 
environment such as an oil spillage, water pollution or generally matters negatively affecting 
the quality of the physical environment supporting human life. This interpretation is, however, 
only a conjecture as neither the Act nor the memorandum accompanying the Bill provides any 
insight. That said, there still remain other unanswered questions. What is the scope of this 
exemption? What is the rationale for this exemption? The preparatory documents on the 
                                                     
49  See the Free Zone Act, 1995 (Act 504), s 32. 
50  See for example, Article 1 of the Stockholm Declaration on the Human Environment, 1972, where 
policies and political situations were considered as part of the environment.  
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passage of the Act provide very little clue on these questions, except a very illuminating 
statement that appears in the Parliamentary records.51 A Member of Parliament in his 
contribution to the debate on the provisions under what is now Section 1 of Act 798 commented 
as follows: 
 
Mr. Speaker, on clause 1 at the winnowing, we dropped an amendment in respect of 
deletion of “environment” and we were assured that we should retain “environment” 
and they will provide a definition in the interpretation column. So I just want to bring 
this to the notice of   the House so that at the Second Consideration stage, they should 
try and submit to this House, a definition of what is “environment”.52  
 
An examination of section 135 of the Act on interpretation reveals that this important and 
insightful advice went unheeded.  
 
Constitutional Interpretation and Enforcement 
Under the 1992 Constitution of Ghana,53 the Supreme Court has exclusive original jurisdiction 
in ‘all matters relating to the enforcement or interpretation’ of the Constitution54 and ‘all 
matters arising as to whether an enactment was made in excess of the powers conferred on 
Parliament or any other authority or person by law or under this Constitution’.55 This power is 
subject only to the powers granted under article 33 of the Constitution, 1992 to the High Court 
to enforce human rights provisions under the Constitution. All other courts are required to refer 
                                                     
51  Parliamentary Debates of Ghana, Official Report, Tuesday, 16th March, 2010, Fourth Series, Volume 67, 
No. 30, Column 2252. 
52  ibid. at 2257; see the contribution of Honourable William Boafo. 
53  Article 1(2) of the Constitution of Ghana, 1992 provides that the Constitution is the supreme law of 
country and any law that is inconsistent with its provisions is void to the extent of the inconsistency. 
54   The Constitution of Ghana, 1992, Articles 2 and 130. 
55  ibid. Article 130 (1) (a) and (b) 
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matters of interpretation and enforcement of the Constitution to the Supreme Court for 
determination.56 Exempting matters of constitutional interpretation and enforcement from the 
scope of Act 798 is thus in accord with the provisions of the supreme law of Ghana.    
What constitutes a matter of interpretation and enforcement of the provisions of the 
Constitution has been the subject matter of judicial decisions57 and has been thought to be well-
settled. However, this provision surprisingly generated the first controversy under Act 798 in 
the Balkan Energy case. One question likely to attract jurisdictional challenges is whether or 
not a transaction constitutes an international business or economic transaction to which the 
government is a party under Article 181 (5) of the 1992 Constitution of Ghana. The answer to 
this question will determine whether a transaction requires parliamentary approval or not. In 
the light of the Balkan Energy case, foreign parties will be well advised to verify whether the 
transactions they are entering into requires parliamentary approval and if so, whether the 
approval has been sought. They may also seek warranties that the relevant approval has been, 
or will be, obtained.   
 
Other matters not capable of settlement by ADR methods 
Where an Act of Parliament has spelt out clearly how a matter should be settled or dealt with, 
the provisions of Act 798 cannot supersede such edict. Accordingly, serious criminal offences 
such as murder and robbery which are first degree felonies under the Criminal Offences Act, 
1960, for example, cannot be settled under the provisions of the Act. However, under section 
73 of the Criminal Offences Act, 1960 (as amended), misdemeanors, offences which are not 
felonies and those not aggravated in degree are capable of amicable settlement by negotiation. 
However, the relevant law prohibiting settlement by ADR is not limited to statute or even the 
                                                     
56  ibid. Article 130(2) 
57  Tuffour v. Attorney-General [1980] GLR 637  ; Aduamoa II v. Twum II [1999-2000] 2GLR 409,S.C; 
Republic v. Maikankan [1971] 2 GLR 473 at 478,SC;   
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law of Ghana. A further source of uncertainty concerns absence of any universal agreement on 
which resolution methods may be classified as ADR. For example, whilst arbitration is 
considered an ADR technique in the US, this is not the practice in the UK.58  
 
Likely Effects of the Excluded Categories on International               
Arbitration 
It is a common theme cutting across most of the reviews of developments in international 
arbitration worldwide that countries reforming their arbitration laws are motivated to capture 
for the benefit of their economies some of the business of providing dispute resolution and 
related services to international business. For example, Keir concluded from his review that 
such countries ‘seek to attract international arbitrations to the home territory, as an adjunct of 
international commerce for the benefit of [their] status and economy, and of …[their] legal and 
other related professions’.59  The benefits of national arbitration law being considered attractive 
by the international business community include less objection to choice of local law as the 
applicable law in dispute resolution clauses and greater acceptability of the territory as the seat 
of international arbitrations. To be found attractive to the international business community, 
the national arbitration law must be easily accessible and conform to international norms,60 
particularly keeping to the minimum necessary to support arbitrations the likelihood of local 
court intervention into disputes covered by arbitration agreements. 
                                                     
58        H.J. Brown. and A.L. Marriott, ADR principles and practice ( 2nd Ed. Sweet & Maxwell,1999) 12 
59  M. Kerr, 'International Commercial Arbitration- Worldwide' in E.Cotran and A.Amissah (n5) 16-17. See 
also G. Herrman, (1998) ‘UNCITRAL Arbitration Law: A Good Model of a Model Law’, (1998) Unif. L. 
Rev. 3, .483.Herrmann posits that adopting the UNCITRAL Model law has a public relations effect. He 
asserts that, ‘it announces to the international business world that a country is not only welcome but it is 
also ready to ensure that those who opt for international arbitration are supported by the domestic legal 
system. 
60  Adoption of the UNCITRAL Model Law or basing the national law on it has been the main route to 
making the law accessible. The extent to which the current Ghana arbitration law conforms to the Model 
Law is outside the scope of the article. 
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Unfortunately, although making Ghana an attractive venue for international arbitrations 
and its arbitration law acceptable in choice of law clauses appeared to be part of the case for 
the enactment of Act 798,61 this consideration did not receive any attention during the 
Parliamentary debate on the Bill in relation to the delineation of the broad categories of 
exemptions. Reading the Memorandum to the Bill reveals that domestic concerns, such as 
clearing the backlog of cases in the courts and providing institutional structures and rules for 
domestic ADR practice, were the main focus of the legislators. For example, the political 
sensitivity of the prospect of certain matters being settled by customary arbitration, the 
applicable law of which varies from ethnic group to ethnic group, was bound to be a major 
concern. Then there were concerns which transcended the confines of customary arbitration to 
all the other forms of ADR such as the resolution of public disputes by private mechanisms.62  
The legislature, judiciary and the legal profession would be far better informed about these 
issues than international commercial arbitration as the use of the latter has been modest and 
without much participation by local lawyers.63 
On the important question of arbitrability by Ghana law, three directions of elasticity 
in the meaning of the excluded matters are discernible. First, as already discussed, the ambit of 
the labels used for the excluded categories is extremely broad. Second, “matters relating” to 
any of the categories are almost limitless. Thirdly, the “any other matter that by law cannot be 
settled by an alternative dispute resolution method” catch-all exclusion could prove to be a 
formidable tool in the arsenal of any recalcitrant party to an arbitration agreement.  
                                                     
61  The arbitrability issue aside, most of the arbitration provisions in Act 798 are based on  the UNCITRAL 
Model Law 
62  See the contribution of Honourable Inusah Fuseini, Member of Parliament in the Parliamentary Debates 
of Ghana, Official Report, Tuesday, 16th March, 2010, Fourth Series, Volume 67, No. 30, Column 2252-
4. 
63  Most of the international arbitration cases involving the Ghana Government or state entities have been 
held in the major arbitration centres in the developed economies, with the legal advisors being 
international law firms based within such jurisdictions. 
22 
 
As further noted by Torgbor,64 there is no territorial limitation to the matters exclude 
under section 1 of Act 798. All that may be required for it to spring into operation will be a 
connection between the transaction in issue and Ghana law by virtue of the latter being the lex 
contractus, the lex fori, the lex loci arbitri or the law of the place of enforcement. For example, 
if Ghana law happens to be the lex loci arbitri, section 1 can become a convenient basis for the 
challenge of the jurisdiction of the arbitrators as the Ghanaian court is obliged to recognize 
arbitration agreements in writing only if they concern “subject-matter capable of settlement by 
arbitration”.65 These areas of uncertainty on what is or is not arbitrable by Ghana law is likely 
to provide huge scope for jurisdictional battles before local and foreign courts in relation to 
international arbitrations associated with Ghana and ample opportunity to resist enforcement 
of arbitration awards, thus undermining the realisation of any motivation to make the country 
an arbitration-friendly jurisdiction. 
 
Jurisdictional Challenges  
Under the new arbitration law, the issue of arbitrability may be raised at three different stages: 
firstly, as part of an objection to the jurisdiction of the tribunal and prior to the first step towards 
a contest on the merits;66 secondly, at any time during the subsequent arbitration proceedings;67 
and finally, after delivery of an arbitration award as a challenge to its enforcement or 
recognition.68 The complexity associated with jurisdictional challenges stems from the fact that 
the arbitral tribunal and the court often have consecutive sequential and concurrent jurisdiction. 
                                                     
64  E.Torgbor, ‘Ghana Outdoors: the New Alternative Dispute Resolution Act 2010 (Act 798): A Brief 
Appraisal (2011) 77(2) Arbitration 211-219 at 212 
65  See the New York Convention, Article II (1) to which Ghana is a signatory. 
66  See Act 798, s25 (1).  
67  ibid. s 25(4) 
68  ibid. s 58(3) 
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The effect of s. 24 of Act 798 is that the parties to an arbitration agreement are at liberty to 
decide, by agreement, who determines the question of arbitrability. It states: 
 
Unless otherwise agreed by the parties, the arbitral tribunal may rule on its own 
jurisdiction particularly in respect of  
(a)    the existence, scope or validity of the arbitration agreement; 
(b)    the existence or validity of the agreement to which the arbitration agreement  
                    relates;   
(c)   whether the matters submitted to arbitration are in accordance with the arbitration  
                   agreement. 
 
It is to be observed that s. 24 essentially adopts Article 16 of the UNCITRAL Model Law on 
the doctrine of Competence/Competence but with two additional features. Firstly, some of the 
commonly invoked matters of jurisdiction are stated expressly. Secondly, the power of the 
tribunal to rule on its own jurisdiction is a default power, i.e., it acquires the power only if the 
parties have not agreed otherwise. The practicalities of international arbitration, e.g., the 
incorporation of international arbitration rules supportive of the Competence/Competence 
doctrine69 and the disabling impact of a dispute on party cooperation, are often such that party 
agreement is more likely to be the exception rather than the norm.  
The power of the tribunal is to “rule” on the matter of jurisdiction; it does not make a 
final decision on the matter. A party dissatisfied with the tribunal’s ruling may repeat the 
                                                     
69  The Model Law, Article 16, the ICC Rules (2012), Article 6   
24 
 
application before the appointing institution70 or the High Court.71 The Act does not provide 
expressly for the situation where one party applies to the appointing institution and the other 
responds by making the same application to the High Court. However, as the determination of 
the application by the appointing institution is subject to judicial review by the High Court,72 
there would little point in following up the application before the appointing institution once 
the same matter comes before the High Court. All the same, there is arguably some value in 
providing expressly for this eventuality in the interest of avoiding unnecessary costs from 
gamesmanship, particularly with novice users of arbitration. In any case, handling of the appeal 
in multiple fora is likely to involve considerable cost and delays, particularly where the facts 
are disputed. Also, considering the difficulties with the scope of the excluded categories, party 
agreement to bypass the tribunal and the appointing institution to the High Court directly may 
be the most cost effective and speedier option depending on the confidence of the parties in the 
efficiency of the courts.73 Such a step may even be taken prior to the constitution of the arbitral 
tribunal where there is joint agreement. Leave of the High Court is required for any appeal 
against its decision or judicial review of the decision of the appointing authority, which is to 
be granted only when the matter involves a fundamental point of law or a special reason exists 
for the appeal or review to go ahead.74 Some English cases suggest that the refusal of leave to 
appeal could be the subject of an appeal to the higher court if the decision to refuse leave was 
reached unfairly.75 
                                                     
70 The appointing authority under Act 798 has power to determine jurisdictional issues. Cf the role of the 
international Court of arbitration under Article 6 of the ICC rules, 2012 where issues relating to the jurisdiction 
of the arbitral tribunal are determined  by the tribunal  notwithstanding any preliminary intervention by the 
Court  
71  See  Act 798, s. 26 
72  ibid s. 26(5) 
73  From our experience, although the courts in general could be faster, the Commercial Court in which 
arbitration matters are brought is comparatively very responsive to the interest of the business 
community in speedy and cost effective determination of disputes. 
74  Act 798, s 26(6) 
75  See: North Range Shipping Ltd. v. Seatrans Shipping Corporation (The Western Triumph) [2002] EWCA 
Civ. 405; [2002] 1 WLR 2307; CGU International Insurance plc v. AstraZeneca Insurance Co. plc 
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Where the issue at stake involves the determination of an issue related to constitutional 
interpretation and enforcement, further complications are introduced. If the arbitral tribunal 
decides that an issue of constitutional interpretation or enforcement is at stake, a further 
application must be brought before the High Court for the said issue to be referred to the 
Supreme Court.  The same procedure needs to be followed where an appointing authority 
decides that a constitutional issue is at stake. The circuitous procedure is attributable to the fact 
that the arbitral tribunal and the appointing authority (if not the High Court) lack power to refer 
such matters directly to the Supreme Court.76  
Allowing jurisdictional challenges to the court is not unique to the Act under 
consideration. Indeed, the system of jurisdictional challenge is broadly the same as under the 
English Arbitration Act 1996.77The concern is that, given the potentially wide scope of the 
exclusions highlighted by our analysis, the risk of satellite litigation on jurisdictional issues 
would be a much larger scale. Such development would accentuate the very shortcomings of 
the local courts that it is sought to remedy by the legislation: delays, lack of familiarity of 
foreign parties to local procedures, lack of confidentiality, lack of trust in the national judicial 
system and lengthy appeal periods78. It must be acknowledged that, although jurisdictional 
challenges will not act as a stay of any arbitral proceeding unless the parties agree 
otherwise,79they will be an unwelcome distraction which may result in further cost and waste 
of time. 
 
Enforcement/Recognition of Awards 
                                                     
[2006] EWCA Civ. 1340; [2007] 1 All ER (Comm) 501. It is to be borne in mind that Art 6 of the 
European Convention on Human Rights provided justification for such appeal. 
76  See  the Constitution of Ghana, 1992, Article 130(2) 
77  The EnglishArbitration Act 1996, ss 31(4). 32(1)& (2) and  32(5) make similar provisions in relation to 
the determination of jurisdictional issues.  
78  R. Gaitskell (n6) 120; J.T. McLaughlin,'Arbitration and Developing Countries' (1979) 13  Int'l Law 211. 
79  Act 798, s 26(4) 
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In respect of the impact of section 1 on challenge of awards, section 58(3) of Act 798 provides 
that, ‘the court shall set aside an arbitral award where it finds that the subject-matter of the 
dispute is incapable of being settled by arbitration or the arbitral award was induced by 
fraud or corruption’ (emphasis added). Thus, an award can be set aside because the subject-
matter is not capable of settlement by arbitration under Ghana law.  A party may challenge the 
validity of a domestic award either by an application to the High Court or at the point of 
enforcement. In both cases, the application may succeed on the basis of a successful challenge 
of the arbitrability of the subject-matter.  The lack of clarity of the confines of the excluded 
categories is likely to provide an opportunity to desperate parties looking for some basis/ground 
to challenge, set aside or prevent the enforcement of an award.   
The unease here is not about the right of the State to set arbitrability criteria. In creating 
these exemptions, Ghana has followed an age old practice accepted by many countries in 
Africa80 and elsewhere in the world. In Germany, for example, non- economic disputes are not 
arbitrable, except those which the parties are entitled to freely dispose.81  Article 3 of the 
Arbitration Law of China, 1994, states that family and marital disputes may not be subject to 
arbitration.  Under section 4 of the Arbitration Act, 2005 of Malaysia (Act 646), the only 
limitation placed on arbitration is when the arbitration agreement is contrary to public policy. 
Under Article 1 (5) of the Model Law, States are not precluded from determining which matters 
are arbitrable and those which are not. The contention here is that the exemptions under Act 
798 are so broad as to defeat the very essence of incorporating the Model Law provisions into 
                                                     
80  The trend in Africa has been that some States omit reference to what subject-matters are covered under 80 
 See the New York Convention, Article II (1). 
80  See the Memorandum to the Alternative Dispute Resolution Bill, 2009, 1 and the Model law, Article 5. 
80  The trend in Africa has been that some States omit reference to what subject-matters are covered under 
the law but rather stipulate issues that are not arbitrable (see Section 2 of the South African Arbitration 
Act, 1965 and Article 7 of the 1993 Tunisian Arbitration Code) and others outline in detail what subject-
matters come under the purview of the law ( e.g. the Arbitration and Conciliation Act ,1988 of Nigeria, 
section 57  and the Egyptian Arbitration law, Article 2). For a detailed discussion of these issues, see A.A 
Asouzu (n47) 146-161.  
81  N. Blackaby and others (n6) para 2.112; S 1030(1) and (2) of the German Code of Civil Procedure. 
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Act 798. Adopting the Model law must result in the alignment of domestic law with 
internationally acceptable principles of arbitration.  
Three options may be considered to deal with the challenges posed by section 1 of Act 
798. Firstly, terms such as ‘public interest’, ‘the environment’ and ‘national interest’ need to 
be expressly defined restrictively to exclude international commercial transactions involving 
the State and State entities and to bring the provisions of Act 798 in line with those of Act 478 
and Act 504. Alternatively, with the exception of that in Section 1 (d), the excluded matters 
could dropped from the legislation as “matter that by law cannot be settled by an alternative 
dispute resolution method” is broad enough to cover most matters not normally considered 
arbitrable under the laws of many countries. The third option is in recognition of the reality 
that the public policy issues concerning commercial arbitration are bound to differ in many 
respects from those applicable to customary arbitration and ADR in its general sense. For 
example, as already explained, customary arbitration is based on an array of different systems 
of ethnic customary laws and may be employed in non-commercial matters such as family 
matters, interests in land, chieftaincy and other forms of traditional administration. There is 
therefore a very strong case for providing for commercial arbitration in a separate piece of 
legislation with specific arbitrability criteria. 
  
 
Conclusion 
Many countries have modernized their national arbitration laws to align them with norms of 
international business transactions as reflected in the UNCITRAL Model law and the New 
York Convention. A common motivation to attract the business of international dispute 
resolution and related legal services for the benefit of their economies is discernible in these 
developments. Ghana has just followed suit but taken the unusual step of enacting one piece of 
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legislation covering not only arbitration but also alternative dispute resolution methods and 
customary resolution dispute methods unique to Ghana. Excluded from the ambit of the Act 
are matters relating to ‘national or public interest’, ‘the environment’, ‘constitutional 
interpretation and enforcement’, and “any other matter that by law cannot be settled by an 
alternative dispute resolution method”. The nebulous nature of these exclusions poses serious 
risk of not only jurisdictional challenges before arbitral tribunals but also challenges to the 
enforcement and recognition of arbitration awards. This risk applies to arbitrations connected 
with Ghana by virtue of: Ghana being the seat of the arbitration or the place of enforcement of 
the award; or the applicable law of the arbitration agreement or the mother contract being the 
law of Ghana. 
The Balkan Energy case highlights the fact that, for two reasons, contracts for the 
procurement of major infrastructure projects entered into between the Government or State 
entities and foreign contractors and consultants are particularly susceptible to arbitrability 
disputes. First, it would only be in exceptional circumstances that it would be possible to deny 
that disputes from such projects are matters relating to the “national or public interest”. 
Secondly, such contracts require Parliamentary approval, a requirement that the foreign 
contracting parties might not be sufficiently aware of. The importance of verifying that the 
requisite approval has been obtained by the Government or the relevant State entity before 
entering to contractual relationship cannot therefore be overemphasized. Where the contract 
must be entered into in advance of the approval, appropriate warranties that such approval will 
be obtained may be prudent although the validity of such warranties is not without some doubt. 
Modern trends on arbitrability are moving towards the widening of the scope of matters 
that can be arbitrated. Applying the exclusions in Act 798 to arbitration would make Ghana 
arbitration law one of the most restrictive legal systems on arbitrability in the world. The 
discourse on the passage of the Act through the Ghana Parliament was focused almost 
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exclusively on the application of the law on domestic disputes, thus suggesting that perhaps 
insufficient attention was paid to the impact of the exclusions on the perceptions of the 
international business community as to the extent to which the Ghanaian arbitration law is 
supportive of commercial international arbitration. Attempting to cover a wide range of dispute 
resolution methods ranging from ADR technique unique to Ghana, through ADR in its wider 
context, to international commercial arbitration was perhaps an over-ambitious undertaking, 
considering the inevitable differences in the underlying policy considerations. Rethinking the 
specific issue of arbitrability criteria under Ghana law is therefore called for. This may be done 
together with examination of the case for hiving off the arbitration provisions in Act 789 as a 
separate piece of legislation dedicated to arbitration.  
 
 
 
 
 
